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Less than discount louis vuitton handbags three weeks later, on July 7, 1953, the U.S. National Security Council adopted a top-secret policy statement covering the period between the signing of the armistice and the negotiation of a peace treaty-an "in- terim" periocl that even a half century later had yet to end, louis vuitton epi leather jasmin according to that definition. Among other measures, the United States was to "continue a program o~ covert operations designed to assist in the achievement Stephen Sprouse Collection of U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Communist China and Korea."32 As ~or what those ob- jectives might be, another top-secret NSC report issued that same day said that Washington could choose one of two mutually exclusive objectives in Ko- rea. One was to continue the clivision of the country, with South Korea to be brought into the U.S. security system as a military ally. The other choice was to ensure that united Korea would be neutral but governed 'oy the regime al- ready in place in the South. The second option, o~ course, was available only i~ North and South could be unified. The policymakers decided after due debate that a reunified and neutral but noncommunist Korea was the pre~ ferred option.33 However, a subsequent international conference at Geneva dicl not reach agreement on LV epi leather a peace treaty_much less on the reunification- with~neutralization option. As we have seen, part of Kim Il-sung's strategy to sul:)vert the South was to restore the prewar North Korean economy and build on it to demonstrate the superiority o~ the socialist system -the mirror image of what Dulles en- visioned for the South. The clifference was that Kim managed to show some quick successes while the Rhee regime in Seoul faltered politically and turned in a dismal economic performance.